Cyril BirksComputational PhilosopherUniversity of Edinburgh

Cognitive science · Moral philosophy · AI governance

CyrilBirks

I am a Computational philosopherStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Computational Philosophy. The use of computational methods — simulation, formal modelling, and machine reasoning — to state philosophical questions precisely enough that competing answers make different, testable predictions. studying multi-agent cooperation and reasoning, with special attention to the features of moral cognition in multi-agent interactions and behaviours.

Cyril Birks, Computational Philosopher

§ 01 — About

Philosophy you can run

Moral Attention under Unidentifiable Value · Autotelic goal generation and strategy-level moral uncertainty

PositionDoctoral researcher, School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh. UKRI funded.

AlsoGuest Lecturer, Medical Informatics, University of Edinburgh

SupervisorsDr Neil Bramley
Dr Tadeg Quillien
Computational Cognitive Science Lab

MethodsConcept learning · Bayesian models of cognition · Autotelic RL · LLM evaluation

PriorResearcher, Oxford Internet Institute
Investment Strategist, Invesco

Plain reading

Computational philosophyStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Computational Philosophy. The use of computational methods — simulation, formal modelling, and machine reasoning — to state philosophical questions precisely enough that competing answers make different, testable predictions. means taking a question philosophers have argued over for two thousand years and making it precise enough to build, and then to test. Mine is about what an agent can know about what mattersStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Moral Epistemology. How moral knowledge is possible, and what could justify a moral belief. The relevant question here is what happens when rival frameworks disagree about what counts rather than about what is the case.. Two very different things get called moral uncertainty. Sometimes I am unsure how much a known thing matters, and evidence can settle it: I know pain is bad, and I want to know how much pain this drug causes. Sometimes I am unsure which framework decides what matters at all — and no evidence settles that, because the rival frameworks do not disagree about what will happen. They disagree about what counts.

The distinction has a sharp consequence. In a world where what you value never touches what you can observe, nothing you see tells you anything about it. Looking harder has exactly zero expected value. That rules out the standard response to moral uncertainty, which is to go and gather more evidence.

So what should an agent do instead? It has one signal that needs no ground truth: its own candidate moral strategies disagree with each other, and disagreement can be computed from the strategies alone. An agent that seeks out the situations where its candidates diverge is writing its own curriculumColas, Karch, Sigaud & Oudeyer, 2022 · JAIR. Autotelic Agents with Intrinsically Motivated Goal-Conditioned RL. Agents that generate and pursue their own goals rather than optimising a goal handed to them. The open problem is what should drive the goal-sampling: usual choices like novelty and learning progress are justified empirically rather than normatively..

Then I need something to measure. An old tradition holds that moral life is mostly about attention and characterStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Virtue Ethics. The tradition that treats character rather than rules or consequences as the primary subject of ethics: what matters is the settled dispositions an agent has acquired, and how they shape perception and action. — what you look at, and how well you look. That becomes measurable once looking is an action: if inspecting a feature costs something, what an agent chooses to examine before it acts is logged behaviour. The agents never see the true value structure, and I do not claim they discover moral truth.

Technical reading

Evaluative-parametric uncertainty concerns the magnitude of a known consideration, or how a known theory scores a given option. It has a well-defined posterior, evidence bears on it, and it resolves in the limit. Strategy-level uncertainty concerns which framework generates the evaluations at all. It does not resolve, because the competing views are not competing empirical hypotheses. The existing computational literature sits almost entirely on the parametric side of that line.

Let a world be a pair in which one parameter governs dynamics and observations and the other governs value, constructed so that the value parameter enters only the scoring function. Trajectory distributions are then invariant to it, and the expected value of information about it is exactly zero — by construction, from the generative model, in two lines. An agent responding to this species of uncertainty by gathering evidence is running an algorithm with a provably zero-valued objective.

Disagreement is operationalised as normalised Jensen–Shannon divergence over the candidates' recommended action distributions: computable without ground truth, bounded, symmetric, with a pedigree in query-by-committee. Within a situation the agent hedges by minimax regret, the classical rule for choice under ignorance rather than risk. That gives goal generation a derivation rather than a rationale — the entailment runs one way, and novelty and learning progress are the controls.

Costly inspection turns Murdoch's and McDowell's claims about moral perception into process-tracing data, with rational inattentionSims, 2003 · J. Monetary Economics. Implications of Rational Inattention. Treats attention as a scarce resource allocated under a cost, and gives conditions under which an allocation is optimal. It supplies a benchmark for an agent's inspection policy that is not merely another agent's inspection policy. supplying a normative benchmark. The central prediction is a crossover, not a main effect: disagreement curricula should beat a value-of-information active learner in the unidentifiable regime and lose to it in the identifiable one. Transfer is tested against held-out regions of value space, not held-out points. The defensible term is underdetermination, not emergence.

§ 02 — Publications

Peer-reviewed & preprint

Expand for abstract and citation. Full list on Google Scholar.

  1. [01]

    Seven barriers to the ethical governance of artificial intelligence in defence

    Antonia-Felicia Toffert, Katharina Klotz, Huw Roberts, Cyril Birks, Mariarosaria Taddeo

    AI & SOCIETY · doi:10.1007/s00146-026-03118-2

    Abstract & citation

    PublishedOpen access

    The ethical governance of AI in defence confronts a paradox: principles proliferate while implementation falters. This systematic review of 1085 publications exposes why frameworks flounder where ethical governance matters most. We identify seven barriers—governance and structural, conceptual, strategic, operational, relational and cultural, technical and data, and resource constraints—that operate as an interconnected system. Governance and structural barriers dominate the literature. This prominence may reflect their visibility rather than their primacy; technical, operational, and cultural dynamics remain harder to trace but are equally consequential. The challenges created by these seven barriers are severe but not insurmountable. We propose three strategic interventions: establishing authoritative, interoperable governance architectures that transcend organisational and national boundaries; building institutional capacity through dedicated resources and interdisciplinary expertise; and integrating ethical governance as core capability throughout the AI lifecycle rather than as compliance retrofit. This systemic analysis advances scholarship beyond principle enumeration and towards understanding the institutional, structural, and technical conditions under which ethical governance of AI in the defence domain can acquire operational traction in contested strategic environments.

    APA

    Toffert, A.-F., Klotz, K., Roberts, H., Birks, C., & Taddeo, M. (2026). Seven barriers to the ethical governance of artificial intelligence in defence. AI & SOCIETY. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-026-03118-2

    BibTeX

    @article{toffert2026seven,
      author  = {Antonia-Felicia Toffert and Katharina Klotz and Huw Roberts and Cyril Birks and Mariarosaria Taddeo},
      title   = {{Seven barriers to the ethical governance of artificial intelligence in defence}},
      journal = {AI \& SOCIETY},
      year    = {2026},
      doi     = {10.1007/s00146-026-03118-2},
      url     = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-026-03118-2}
    }
    Read the paper
  2. [02]

    A Policy Design Framework for Effective Ethical Governance of Artificial Intelligence in Defence

    Antonia-Felicia Toffert, Cyril Birks, Mariarosaria Taddeo

    SSRN · doi:10.2139/ssrn.6874566

    Abstract & citation

    Preprint

    Ethical governance of artificial intelligence (AI) in defence must be legitimate under democratic standards and effective under operational pressure. The values it should serve are largely settled, as reflected in Just War Theory, International Humanitarian Law, and a convergent body of AI ethics. What is missing are the procedures to bind those principles to authoritative decision, institutional responsibility, and operational constraint. The deficit is therefore procedural, not substantive. In this article, we focus on ethical governance as a problem of policy design. Any such design must address three non-substitutable problems, those of knowledge, of authority and accountability, and of justification, each dominant at a different stage of the policy process: knowledge at inception, justification at deliberation, authority and accountability at operationalisation. We argue that defence does not create new problems but intensifies these, through recurring conditions such as operational tempo, secrecy, and coalition fragmentation that raise their difficulty without altering their kind. From this we build a stage-differentiated framework anchored by three instruments, a Non-Delegable Normative Decisions Register that records the substantive limits no procedure may override, diagonal-tiered transparency and accountability structures that allocate authority and extend scrutiny beyond the chain of command, and an Operational Requirements and Constraints Specification that converts those commitments into auditable parameters. The framework secures legitimacy through compliance with its procedures and makes its effectiveness assessable, so failures of either kind become visible and answerable.

    APA

    Toffert, A.-F., Birks, C., & Taddeo, M. (2026). A Policy Design Framework for Effective Ethical Governance of Artificial Intelligence in Defence [Preprint]. SSRN. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6874566

    BibTeX

    @misc{toffert2026policy,
      author       = {Antonia-Felicia Toffert and Cyril Birks and Mariarosaria Taddeo},
      title        = {{A Policy Design Framework for Effective Ethical Governance of Artificial Intelligence in Defence}},
      howpublished = {SSRN preprint},
      year         = {2026},
      doi          = {10.2139/ssrn.6874566},
      url          = {https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6874566}
    }
    Read the preprint
View full list on Google Scholar

§ 03 — Projects

Projects & works in progress

Live
site

The Price of Intelligence

A benchmark comparing what a completed task costs when a human mind does it versus a machine one — in dollars, and in watt-hours. The three cost layers (marginal, sustaining, training) are treated as lenses inside the market price rather than things to be summed: a wage already repays food and education; an API price already covers electricity and amortises the training run. Model prices, electricity prices and earnings data refresh on a daily automated job, and every snapshot is dated and kept.

thepriceofintelligence.com ↗

§ 04 — Curriculum Vitae

The record

Showing 5 highlights of 22 entries.

Education

2025 — 2029

PhD Informatics

University of Edinburgh

Designing Responsible NLP CDT. Recipient of a four-year UKRI doctoral scholarship valued at £165k, supporting interdisciplinary research in the design, deployment, and governance of frontier AI.

2020

MSc Psychology

University of St Andrews

Cognition & Behavioural Neuroscience

Merit

2018

PGDip Health Science

University of Otago

Bioethics

Distinction

2016

BA Philosophy

University of Otago

Moral Philosophy

First Class

Appointments

Dec 2025 — Sep 2026

Researcher

Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford

Frontier AI policy in high-risk domains and high-stakes decision-making with Professor Mariarosaria Taddeo. Funded by DSTL and the European Commission.

Dec 2025 — Jul 2026

AI Safety Researcher

London Stock Exchange Group

PhD industry collaboration on AI safety, alignment, and interpretability for large language models, with a particular emphasis on chain-of-thought and agent faithfulness.

Jan 2025 — Sep 2025

Researcher

King's College London

Peer reviewed and developed 12 of 31 chapters for Contemporary Debates in the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence (2026).

Jan 2025 — Sep 2025

Research Fellowship

Cambridge AI Safety Hub

Geopolitical analysis of frontier AI, assessing how macroeconomic and strategic dependencies across the AI value chain support the case for sovereign UK control over critical infrastructure and capabilities.

2024

Research Manager

UKRI Policymakers Lab, University of Warwick

Built and managed relationships with politicians, policymakers, and global research bodies. Co-developed dissemination strategy and a passive recruitment pipeline for policymaker engagement.

2022 — 2024

Investment Strategist

Invesco

Developed forecasting and scenario models for global macroeconomic trends, including emerging technology and geopolitics. Translated complex analyses into actionable insights for institutional investors and C-suite stakeholders.

Awards & Funding

2025

UKRI Doctoral Scholarship

UK Research and Innovation

Four-year scholarship valued at £165k.

2024

Best AI Thought Leadership

Savvy Investor

2024

Top 10 Whitepapers

Savvy Investor

Teaching

Dec 2025 — Mar 2026

Guest Lecturer & Tutor

University of Edinburgh

Ethics in Medical Informatics, alongside Dr. Nayha Sethi (Chancellor's Fellow, Data Driven Innovation).

2017 & 2018

Campbell Bioethics Teaching Fellow

University of Otago

Talks & Presentations

Mar 2026

"UK Sovereign AI"

Minister for AI

Dec 2025

"The Nature of Digital Minds"

Wilks Moral Psychology Lab

Sep 2025

"Partial Aggregationist Ethics in Real-World AI Deployment"

Bramley Computational Cognition Lab

Jan 2024

World Economic Forum

Invesco

Researched and co-authored the Invesco presentations for executive leadership at Davos.

Editorial & Review

2026

Executive Editor

Minds & Machines

2025

Peer Review & Chapter Development

King's College London

Reviewed and developed 12 of 31 chapters for Contemporary Debates in the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence (2026).

Volunteering

2022 — 2026

Marine Wildlife Conservation

The Americas

Assisting in the survival of loggerhead sea turtles by preserving nests and evaluating hatches.

§ 05 — Contact

Get in touch

Open toI welcome enquiries from researchers, journalists, and members of the public with an interest in the work.

Email
cyril.birks [at] ed.ac.uk
Office
Edinburgh Futures Institute
Scholar
Google Scholar
Writing
Substack