Skip to contentCyril BirksComputational PhilosopherUniversity of Edinburgh
Cognitive science · Moral philosophy · AI governance
CyrilBirks
I am a Computational philosopherStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Computational Philosophy. The use of computational methods — simulation, formal modelling, and machine reasoning — to state philosophical questions precisely enough that competing answers make different, testable predictions. studying multi-agent cooperation and reasoning, with special attention to the features of moral cognition in multi-agent interactions and behaviours.
PriorResearcher, Oxford Internet Institute Investment Strategist, Invesco
Plain reading
Computational philosophyStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Computational Philosophy. The use of computational methods — simulation, formal modelling, and machine reasoning — to state philosophical questions precisely enough that competing answers make different, testable predictions. means taking a
question philosophers have argued over for two thousand years and making it
precise enough to build, and then to test. Mine is about
what an agent can know about what mattersStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Moral Epistemology. How moral knowledge is possible, and what could justify a moral belief. The relevant question here is what happens when rival frameworks disagree about what counts rather than about what is the case..
Two very different things get called moral uncertainty. Sometimes I am unsure how much
a known thing matters, and evidence can settle it: I know pain is bad, and I want to
know how much pain this drug causes. Sometimes I am unsure which framework decides
what matters at all — and no evidence settles that, because the rival frameworks do
not disagree about what will happen. They disagree about what counts.
The distinction has a sharp consequence. In a world where what you value never
touches what you can observe, nothing you see tells you anything about it. Looking
harder has exactly zero expected value. That rules out the standard response to moral
uncertainty, which is to go and gather more evidence.
So what should an agent do instead? It has one signal that needs no ground
truth: its own candidate moral strategies disagree with each other, and disagreement
can be computed from the strategies alone. An agent that seeks out the situations where
its candidates diverge is writing its own
curriculumColas, Karch, Sigaud & Oudeyer, 2022 · JAIR. Autotelic Agents with Intrinsically Motivated Goal-Conditioned RL. Agents that generate and pursue their own goals rather than optimising a goal handed to them. The open problem is what should drive the goal-sampling: usual choices like novelty and learning progress are justified empirically rather than normatively..
Then I need something to measure. An old tradition holds that moral life is
mostly about attention and characterStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Virtue Ethics. The tradition that treats character rather than rules or consequences as the primary subject of ethics: what matters is the settled dispositions an agent has acquired, and how they shape perception and action. — what you look at, and how well you look. That becomes
measurable once looking is an action: if inspecting a feature costs something, what an
agent chooses to examine before it acts is logged behaviour. The agents never see the
true value structure, and I do not claim they discover moral truth.
Technical reading
Evaluative-parametric uncertainty concerns the magnitude of a known
consideration, or how a known theory scores a given option. It has a well-defined
posterior, evidence bears on it, and it resolves in the limit.
Strategy-level uncertainty concerns which framework generates the evaluations
at all. It does not resolve, because the competing views are not competing empirical
hypotheses. The existing computational literature sits almost entirely on the
parametric side of that line.
Let a world be a pair in which one parameter governs dynamics and observations
and the other governs value, constructed so that the value parameter enters only the
scoring function. Trajectory distributions are then invariant to it, and the expected
value of information about it is exactly zero — by construction, from the
generative model, in two lines. An agent responding to this species of uncertainty by
gathering evidence is running an algorithm with a provably zero-valued objective.
Disagreement is operationalised as normalised Jensen–Shannon divergence over the
candidates' recommended action distributions: computable without ground truth, bounded,
symmetric, with a pedigree in query-by-committee. Within a situation the agent hedges
by minimax regret, the classical rule for choice under ignorance rather than
risk. That gives goal generation a derivation rather than a rationale — the
entailment runs one way, and novelty and learning progress are the controls.
Costly inspection turns Murdoch's and McDowell's claims about moral perception
into process-tracing data, with rational inattentionSims, 2003 · J. Monetary Economics. Implications of Rational Inattention. Treats attention as a scarce resource allocated under a cost, and gives conditions under which an allocation is optimal. It supplies a benchmark for an agent's inspection policy that is not merely another agent's inspection policy. supplying a
normative benchmark.
The central prediction is a crossover, not a main effect: disagreement
curricula should beat a value-of-information active learner in the unidentifiable
regime and lose to it in the identifiable one. Transfer is tested against held-out
regions of value space, not held-out points. The defensible term is
underdetermination, not emergence.
§ 02 — Publications
Peer-reviewed & preprint
Expand for abstract and citation. Full list on Google Scholar.
[01]
Seven barriers to the ethical governance of artificial intelligence in defence
The ethical governance of AI in defence confronts a paradox: principles proliferate while implementation falters. This systematic review of 1085 publications exposes why frameworks flounder where ethical governance matters most. We identify seven barriers—governance and structural, conceptual, strategic, operational, relational and cultural, technical and data, and resource constraints—that operate as an interconnected system. Governance and structural barriers dominate the literature. This prominence may reflect their visibility rather than their primacy; technical, operational, and cultural dynamics remain harder to trace but are equally consequential. The challenges created by these seven barriers are severe but not insurmountable. We propose three strategic interventions: establishing authoritative, interoperable governance architectures that transcend organisational and national boundaries; building institutional capacity through dedicated resources and interdisciplinary expertise; and integrating ethical governance as core capability throughout the AI lifecycle rather than as compliance retrofit. This systemic analysis advances scholarship beyond principle enumeration and towards understanding the institutional, structural, and technical conditions under which ethical governance of AI in the defence domain can acquire operational traction in contested strategic environments.
APA
Toffert, A.-F., Klotz, K., Roberts, H., Birks, C., & Taddeo, M. (2026). Seven barriers to the ethical governance of artificial intelligence in defence. AI & SOCIETY. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-026-03118-2
BibTeX
@article{toffert2026seven,
author = {Antonia-Felicia Toffert and Katharina Klotz and Huw Roberts and Cyril Birks and Mariarosaria Taddeo},
title = {{Seven barriers to the ethical governance of artificial intelligence in defence}},
journal = {AI \& SOCIETY},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1007/s00146-026-03118-2},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-026-03118-2}
}
Ethical governance of artificial intelligence (AI) in defence must be legitimate under democratic standards and effective under operational pressure. The values it should serve are largely settled, as reflected in Just War Theory, International Humanitarian Law, and a convergent body of AI ethics. What is missing are the procedures to bind those principles to authoritative decision, institutional responsibility, and operational constraint. The deficit is therefore procedural, not substantive. In this article, we focus on ethical governance as a problem of policy design. Any such design must address three non-substitutable problems, those of knowledge, of authority and accountability, and of justification, each dominant at a different stage of the policy process: knowledge at inception, justification at deliberation, authority and accountability at operationalisation. We argue that defence does not create new problems but intensifies these, through recurring conditions such as operational tempo, secrecy, and coalition fragmentation that raise their difficulty without altering their kind. From this we build a stage-differentiated framework anchored by three instruments, a Non-Delegable Normative Decisions Register that records the substantive limits no procedure may override, diagonal-tiered transparency and accountability structures that allocate authority and extend scrutiny beyond the chain of command, and an Operational Requirements and Constraints Specification that converts those commitments into auditable parameters. The framework secures legitimacy through compliance with its procedures and makes its effectiveness assessable, so failures of either kind become visible and answerable.
APA
Toffert, A.-F., Birks, C., & Taddeo, M. (2026). A Policy Design Framework for Effective Ethical Governance of Artificial Intelligence in Defence [Preprint]. SSRN. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6874566
BibTeX
@misc{toffert2026policy,
author = {Antonia-Felicia Toffert and Cyril Birks and Mariarosaria Taddeo},
title = {{A Policy Design Framework for Effective Ethical Governance of Artificial Intelligence in Defence}},
howpublished = {SSRN preprint},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.2139/ssrn.6874566},
url = {https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6874566}
}
A benchmark comparing what a completed task costs when a human mind does it versus a machine one — in dollars, and in watt-hours. The three cost layers (marginal, sustaining, training) are treated as lenses inside the market price rather than things to be summed: a wage already repays food and education; an API price already covers electricity and amortises the training run. Model prices, electricity prices and earnings data refresh on a daily automated job, and every snapshot is dated and kept.
thepriceofintelligence.com ↗
§ 04 — Curriculum Vitae
The record
Showing 5 highlights of 22 entries.
Education
2025 — 2029
PhD Informatics
University of Edinburgh
Designing Responsible NLP CDT. Recipient of a four-year UKRI doctoral scholarship valued at £165k, supporting interdisciplinary research in the design, deployment, and governance of frontier AI.
2020
MSc Psychology
University of St Andrews
Cognition & Behavioural Neuroscience
Merit
2018
PGDip Health Science
University of Otago
Bioethics
Distinction
2016
BA Philosophy
University of Otago
Moral Philosophy
First Class
Appointments
Dec 2025 — Sep 2026
Researcher
Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford
Frontier AI policy in high-risk domains and high-stakes decision-making with Professor Mariarosaria Taddeo. Funded by DSTL and the European Commission.
Dec 2025 — Jul 2026
AI Safety Researcher
London Stock Exchange Group
PhD industry collaboration on AI safety, alignment, and interpretability for large language models, with a particular emphasis on chain-of-thought and agent faithfulness.
Jan 2025 — Sep 2025
Researcher
King's College London
Peer reviewed and developed 12 of 31 chapters for Contemporary Debates in the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence (2026).
Jan 2025 — Sep 2025
Research Fellowship
Cambridge AI Safety Hub
Geopolitical analysis of frontier AI, assessing how macroeconomic and strategic dependencies across the AI value chain support the case for sovereign UK control over critical infrastructure and capabilities.
2024
Research Manager
UKRI Policymakers Lab, University of Warwick
Built and managed relationships with politicians, policymakers, and global research bodies. Co-developed dissemination strategy and a passive recruitment pipeline for policymaker engagement.
2022 — 2024
Investment Strategist
Invesco
Developed forecasting and scenario models for global macroeconomic trends, including emerging technology and geopolitics. Translated complex analyses into actionable insights for institutional investors and C-suite stakeholders.
Awards & Funding
2025
UKRI Doctoral Scholarship
UK Research and Innovation
Four-year scholarship valued at £165k.
2024
Best AI Thought Leadership
Savvy Investor
2024
Top 10 Whitepapers
Savvy Investor
Teaching
Dec 2025 — Mar 2026
Guest Lecturer & Tutor
University of Edinburgh
Ethics in Medical Informatics, alongside Dr. Nayha Sethi (Chancellor's Fellow, Data Driven Innovation).
2017 & 2018
Campbell Bioethics Teaching Fellow
University of Otago
Talks & Presentations
Mar 2026
"UK Sovereign AI"
Minister for AI
Dec 2025
"The Nature of Digital Minds"
Wilks Moral Psychology Lab
Sep 2025
"Partial Aggregationist Ethics in Real-World AI Deployment"
Bramley Computational Cognition Lab
Jan 2024
World Economic Forum
Invesco
Researched and co-authored the Invesco presentations for executive leadership at Davos.
Editorial & Review
2026
Executive Editor
Minds & Machines
2025
Peer Review & Chapter Development
King's College London
Reviewed and developed 12 of 31 chapters for Contemporary Debates in the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence (2026).
Volunteering
2022 — 2026
Marine Wildlife Conservation
The Americas
Assisting in the survival of loggerhead sea turtles by preserving nests and evaluating hatches.
§ 05 — Contact
Get in touch
Open toI welcome enquiries from researchers, journalists, and members of the public with an interest in the work.